Leia íntegra dos arquivos do Wikileaks obtidos pela Folha

DE SÃO PAULO

2005-05-06

S E C R E T

SUBJECT: BRAZIL: Ambassador's Lunch with General Jorge Armando Felix, Minister for Institutional Security

Classified by Ambassador John J. Danilovich

Ambassador hosted General Jorge Armando Felix, Minister for Institutional Security, for lunch at the residence on 4 May 2005. While General Felix has much less influence than his predecessor from the previous government, he is still the country's most senior intelligence official and the rough equivalent of national security advisor to the president.

The Tri-Border Region: The Ambassador asked General Felix for an assessment of the transnational crime situation in the tri-border region of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. General Felix admitted that there were serious problems in the region and that the illegal movement of arms, money, drugs and the like through the region was of concern to the Brazilian Government. Felix said that both ABIN and the Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) were devoting additional personnel and resources to the problem and noted that ABIN even had some joint programs with RMAS that were focused on these issues.

This led to a discussion on terrorism issues/operations in the tri-border region and throughout Brazil. General Felix said that ABIN worked closely with RMAS in jointly targeting individuals of interest, and the Ambassador expressed his appreciation for this assistance.

General Felix said that in addition to the joint operations that we were working together, the Brazilian government was also appealing to moderate, second generation Arabs, many of whom were successful businessmen in Brazil, to keep a close eye on fellow Arabs who may be influenced by Arab extremists and/or terrorist groups. General Felix said that it was in the interest of these moderate, Arabs to keep potential firebrands in line and keep the microscope off of the Arab community in Brazil.

General Felix said that it was important that counterterrorism operations were packaged properly so as not to negatively reflect on the proud and successful Arab community in Brazil.

The Ambassador asked General Felix if there were any areas where the USG could better assist the GSI and/or ABIN. Felix said that he was very happy with the assistance currently being provided by the USG. One area where he claimed that the Brazilian Government was falling behind was in protecting its own classified and unclassified computer systems. Felix said that he would welcome any assistance (courses, visitors, etc.) in this area.

Felix also said that he was trying to beef up the GSI and ABIN's SIGINT capabilities and could always use some assistance along those lines.

General Felix has always been a straightforward interlocutor, and his term at GSI has been highlighted by very cooperative, joint CT operations between RMAS and ABIN. All in all, his continued presence at GSI bodes well for U.S. interests.

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2008-01-08

S E C R E T

SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM IN BRAZIL: LOOKING BEYOND THE TRI-BORDER AREA

Clifford Sobel

The Government of Brazil remains highly sensitive to public claims suggesting that terrorist or extremist organizations have a presence or are undertaking activities in Brazil--a sensitivity that appears to be the rise and is resulting in more than symbolic reactions. At an operational level and away from the public spotlight, however, the GOB is a cooperative partner in countering terrorism and terrorist-related activities.

Even though the Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay tri-border area (TBA) exclusively dominates headlines, the primary counterterrorism concern for both Brazilian officials and the U.S. Mission in Brazil is the presence and activities of individuals with links to terrorism--particularly several suspected Sunni extremists and some individuals linked to Hizballah--in São Paulo and other areas of southern Brazil.

The Brazilian government is a cooperative partner in countering terrorism and terrorist-related activity in Brazil--to include investigating potential terrorism financing, document forgery networks, and other illicit activity--that could contribute to the facilitation of attacks in the region or elsewhere.

Nonetheless, the highest levels of the Brazilian government, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Relations, are extremely sensitive to any public claims that terrorists have a presence in Brazil--whether to raise funds, arrange logistics, or even transit through the country--and will vigorously reject any statements implying otherwise. This sensitivity results, in part, from their fear of stigmatizing the large Muslim community of Brazil (estimated, but unconfirmed, by some sources at over 1 million) or prejudicing the area's image as a tourist destination. It is also a public posture designed to avoid being too closely linked to what is seen as the US's overly aggressive War on Terrorism.

This sensitivity manifests itself in various symbolic and concrete ways. The GOB participates reluctantly in the "3 1 Mechanism on Security in the Triborder Area," which annually gathers diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence representatives of the three Triborder (TBA) countries together with the U.S. to deliberate strategies to deter a host of transnational criminal activities that could be exploited by potential terrorists to facilitate attacks. At the conferences, the Brazilian delegations often decry statements made by U.S. officials claiming that the TBA is a hotbed of terrorist activity and challenge U.S. participants to present the evidence on which U.S. officials base those statements. Itamaraty officials repeatedly question the value of this four-way cooperation, insisting that "bilateral concerns should be addressed bilaterally" (reftel).

The GOB refuses to legally or even rhetorically label U.S.-designated terrorist groups such as HAMAS, Hizballah or the FARC as terrorist groups--the former two being considered by Brazil as legitimate political parties. As a result, their threshold for accepting evidence of terrorism financing activity in the region, at least publicly, is very high and any information indicating that individuals in the TBA send funds to the groups in Lebanon, in their view, does not necessarily constitute an activity supporting terrorism.

Despite negative rhetoric in Itamaraty and at higher levels of the GOB, Brazilian law enforcement and intelligence agencies--principally the Federal Police, Customs, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), and others--are aware of the potential threat from terrorists exploiting the favorable conditions existing in Brazil to operate and actively track and monitor suspected terrorist activity and follow all leads passed to them.

The Federal Police will often arrest individuals with links to terrorism, but will charge them on a variety of non-terrorism related crimes to avoid calling attention of the media and the higher levels of the government. Over the past year the Federal Police has arrested various individuals engaged in suspected terrorism financing activity but have based their arrests on narcotics and customs charges.

The primary counterterrorism concern for both Brazilian officials and the U.S. Mission in Brazil is the presence and activities of individuals with links to terrorism--particularly several suspected Sunni extremists and some individuals linked to Hizballah--in São Paulo and other areas of southern Brazil. The Federal Police, and to a lesser extent ABIN, monitor the activities of these suspected extremists who may be tied to terrorist groups abroad and share this information with their U.S. counterparts.

Brazilian law enforcement officials actively monitor the presence of several suspected Sunni extremists with possible ties to terrorist groups abroad who may be capable of lending logistical support--through financing, safehaven, false travel documents-- for terrorist attacks in the region or abroad.

In 2007, the Federal Police arrested a potential Sunni extremist terrorist facilitator operating primarily in Santa Catarina state for failure to declare funds entering the country and is in the process of deporting him. Also in 2007, Brazilian Federal Police took down a Rio de Janeiro-based false document ring that was supplying falsified Brazilian documents to non-Brazilians, among them suspected international drug traffickers.

To a lesser extent, the TBA remains a concern for the U.S. Mission and Brazilian counterparts, primarily for the potential that terrorists may exploit the favorable conditions there--lax border controls, smuggling, drug trafficking, easy access to false documents and weapons, movement of pirated goods, uncontrolled cash flows--to raise funds or arrange logistics for operations. While there are some individuals suspected of having links to Hizballah and HAMAS, there is little evidence these groups have an operational terrorist presence in the region.

The GOB pursues CT investigations in the TBA and shares the results of their investigations, but their principal concern remains the array of other transnational criminal activity that takes place in the region. The area is a major entry point for drug traffickers into Brazil. In addition, it is a focus of concern for Brazil in other areas such as arms trafficking, smuggling of pirated and counterfeit goods, as well as money laundering and terrorist financing.

To cover this range of transnational criminal activity, the GOB's police and intelligence services have an extensive presence in the region and liaison relationships with Argentine, Paraguayan, and other national intelligence services, including USG agencies. Furthermore, the GOB has attempted to institutionalize some of this cross-border cooperation, although with mixed success.

For example, Brazilian Customs completed a new inspection station at the Friendship Bridge in the TBA. This should enable the GOB to intensify its crack down on contraband crossing the bridge, though law enforcement officials expect that traffickers will respond to the tough controls by trying to move their goods clandestinely across the border elsewhere via boat.

Post will focus over the coming year on keeping the higher levels of the Brazilian government engaged politically and diplomatically on this issue, and on seeking to ensure that they do not undermine the work being done at the operational level. End Comm...